

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

----- 055513

O R 151109Z FEB 75

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 738

AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 1023

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE PFOR XG

SUBJECT: CSCE OVERVIEW

BONN FOR THE SECRETARY'S PARTY

1. SUMMARY: DESPITE A TOUGH SOVIET STANCE ON MILITARY SECURITY AND BASKET III, WESTERN DELEGATIONS ARE GENERALLY IN A COMPROMISING MOOD AND ANXIOUS TO FINISH STAGE II NEGOTIATIONS THIS SPRING. IF SOVIETS SHOW A MINIMAL AMOUNT OF FLEXIBILITY, BULK OF SUBSTANTIVE WORK COULD BE COMPLETED BY EASTER, WITH FEW REMAINING SUBSTANTIVE ITEMS AND STAGE III ARRANGEMENTS (SCENARIO, FORM OF FINAL DOCUMENT, ETC.) WRAPPED UP BY LATE MAY OR EARLY JUNE. IF SOVIETS REMAIN INTRANSIGENT, HOWEVER, WESTERN COUNTRIES COULD RESPOND IN KIND AND FURTHER PROLONG STAGE II. SEVERAL PERIPHERAL ISSUES, SUCH AS CYPRUS, COULD ALSO DELAY THE CONCLUSION OF CSCE. END SUMMARY.

2. SOVIETS--THE SOVIETS PRESUMABLY HAVE AN INTEREST IN HOLDING STAGE III BY LATE JUNE OR EARLY JULY, TO FIT INTO THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (V-E DAY AND WP ANNIVERSARIES, EUROPEAN CP CONFERENCE, AND CPSU CONGRESS) WHICH THEY ARE PLANNING. WHILE OTHER ELEMENTS, SUCH AS BREZHNEV'S STATUS, COULD LEAD THEM TO PREFER A LATER DATE, CONFIDENTIAL

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THEY HAVE PRESSURED LARGER WESTERN COUNTRIES INDIVIDUALLY TO AGREE

TO AN EARLY STAGE III SUMMIT, WITH SOME SUCCESS. WE BELIEVE THEY NOW CALCULATE THAT THE MAJOR WESTERN GOVERNMENTS ARE COMMITTED IN PRINCIPLE TO A SUMMIT CONCLUSION, AND THAT A FEW COMPROMISE GESTURES ON KEY ISSUES AT THE RIGHT TIME WILL SEW UP THE LEVEL AND TIMING OF STATE III TO THEIR SATISFACTION. AT THE SAME TIME THEIR NUMBER ONE PRIORITY REMAINS THE "QUALITY" OF CSCE TEXTS, AND THEY SEEM PREPARED, FOR THE MOMENT AT LEAST, TO LET STAGE II DRAG ON IF THAT IS NECESSARY TO OBTAIN THE KIND OF TEXTS THEY WANT. THUS THE INFLEXIBILITY THEY HAVE SHOWN SINCE THE CHRISTMAS RECESS HAS BEEN DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY HAVE VIRTUALLY REACHED THE LIMIT OF THEIR CONCESSIONS, TO REDUCE WESTERN AND NEUTRAL AMBITIONS, AND TO MAKE OTHER DELEGATIONS GRATEFUL FOR SMALL SOVIET GESTURES WHEN THEY COME.

3. THE WEST--EACH OF THE LARGER WESTERN COUNTRIES HAS ITS OWN MIS OF REASONS FOR WANTING GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS AND ALL HAVE THUS RETREATED SUBSTANTIALLY, UNDER HEAVY AND CONTINUOUS SOVIET PRESSURES, FROM THEIR MAXIMUM CSCE POSITIONS. MOST WESTERN GOVERNMENTS WOULD NOW CLEARLY LIKE TO CONCLUDE CSCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE STILL TWO OR THREE HOLD-OUTS ON CERTAIN ISSUES. MOST WESTERN COUNTRIES WOULD PROBABLY ACCEPT AS SATISFACTORY MINIMAL SOVIET CONCESSIONS ON THE REMAINING UNSETTLED ISSUES. BUT, ANTICIPATING CLOSE MEDIA AND PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY OF KEY CSCE DOCUMENTS THEY WILL NOT ACCEPT TEXTS THAT ARE PATENTLY WORTHLESS. THUS THE SOVIETS MAY OVERPLAY THEIR HAND. IF THEY ARE COMPLETELY INTRANSIGENT, WESTERN POSITIONS MAY STIFFEN AND THE CONFERENCE COULD BE PROLONGED.

4. HOW THE SOVIETS COULD WRAP IT UP--A FEW SOVIET GESTURES COULD WRAP THINGS UP QUICKLY: A REASONABLE SOLUTION ON PEACEFUL CHANGE, ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE OF NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS IN ALL OF EUROPE (WITH EXCEPTIONS FOR USSR AND TURKEY) AND TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES, AGREEMENT TO MINIMAL MANEUVER PARAMETERS (HYPOTHETICALLY 200 KM FROM SOVIET FRONTIERS, 15-20 DAYS NOTIFICATION, 20,000 MEN), AND A FEW SHIFTS IN NUANCES OF BASKET III TEXTS. THE SOVIETS PRESUMABLY ARE WELL AWARE OF THIS SITUATION AND ARE WAITING FOR THE RIGHT MOMENT TO MOVE. IF OUR ANALYSIS OF THEIR PREFERRED TIMING IS CORRECT, THE BEST TIME FOR THEM TO MAKE THEIR GESTURES MAY BE DURING THE 2-3 WEEKS BEFORE THE EASTER RECESS (LIKELY TO BEGIN MARCH 21), WHICH WOULD GIVE TIME TO SETTLE THE

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FEW REMAINING SUBSTANTIVE ITEMS DURING APRIL. SUCH A TACTIC WOULD MAKE IT MOST DIFFICULT FOR ANY COUNTRY TO RESIST THE GENERAL DESIRE AND MOMENTUM TO CONCLUDE CSCE.

5. PERIPHERAL ISSUES--THERE REMAIN SOME SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH COULD DELAY A CSCE CONCLUSION. THE NEUTRALS GENERALLY WANT TO FINISH QUICKLY, BUT, LED BY THE YUGOSLAVS, THEY COULD HOLD OUT FOR BETTER RESULTS ON CBMS. THE YUGOSLAVS COULD EXERT PRESSURE

ON THE SOVIETS ON SUBJECTS OF INTEREST TO THEM, SINCE THEY ARE WELL PLACED TO DELAY THE EUROPEAN CP CONFERENCE. THE MALTESE AND YUGOSLAVS MIGHT ALSO HOLD OUT FOR SOME ROLE FOR NON-PARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN STATES IN STAGE III AND/OR FOLLOW-UP. ADDITIONALLY, IF THE CYPRUS SITUATION IS NOT RESOLVED, THE TURKS COULD RAISE PROBLEMS OVER CYPRIOT CREDENTIALS, OR THE GREEKS AND CYPRIOTS COULD REFUSE TO GIVE THEIR CONSENSUS ON STAGE II TEXTS.

6. CONCLUSION--IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE FOR CSCE TO FINISH THE BULK OF ITS SUBSTANTIVE WORK BY EASTER, AND TO COMPLETE STAGE II NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING AGREEMENT ON DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS FOR STAGE III, BY LATE MAY OR EARLY JUNE, OPENING THE WAY FOR STATE III IN LATE JUNE OR EARLY JULY. DALE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: COLLECTIVE SECURITY, MINISTERIAL MEETINGS, MEETING PROCEEDINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 15 FEB 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975GENEVA01023
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750055-1026
From: GENEVA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750239/aaaabiwo.tel
Line Count: 128
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 16 MAY 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <16 MAY 2003 by ifshinsr>; APPROVED <19 MAY 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CSCE OVERVIEW BONN FOR THE SECRETARY'S PARTY
TAGS: PFOR, XG, CSCE
To: STATE BONN
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006